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‘It’s a poor sort of memory that only works backwards’
– Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What 
Alice Found There
Introduction: Through the Rabbit Hole
Digital-born photography can be seen as both an indicator and 
a catalyst of a virtual and incorporeal visuality that constitutes an 
alternative to the perspectival, oculocentric and linear visual schemas 
inherited from the renaissance.1 This new visual regime disposes 
with the mono-centred grid of Brunelleschi’s perspective in favour 
of a grid of /bre-optic cables, wi-/ transmitters, retina displays and 
electric power wires.2 Visual culture has now entered a phase in which 
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computers and not humans are the ones who process, sort, store, 
archive and distribute images.3 When computers look at photographs 
they do not see aunt Helena, a sunset or a birthday cake with 
candles. Here a photograph is calculable information, not different 
from other bits of calculable information that we quaintly refer to 
as songs, #lms and books. In other words, digital-born photography 
is now part of the infectious, ubiquitous, seductive and addictive 
networked environment that underpins not only our interactions with 
computers but also the way individuals reach out to each-other via 
social networks, navigate through the city in a way that resembles 
sur#ng the web with a smartphone (from one wi-# point to the next), 
decide where to go, what to consume and what to do by imperceptibly 
drawing from a layer of computational, algorithmic, remotely stored 
and processed information. The availability of this layer of screen-
based information determines to large extent each individual’s reach 
into the world and her/his ability to realise plans and projects.4
Out of Time
An image on a computer might look like a photograph and this 
resemblance can prompt discussions about the meaning of the 
image in the spirit of the Saussureian science of signs. However such 
semiological considerations are unhelpful as they usually lead to 
thinking about the image as signi#er, coded message or representation 
and leave some questions unanswered – for instance: what can the 
digital image tell us about the network, and what is its relationship 
to time. It is perhaps more constructive to consider the digital image 
as a layer of ubiquitous information that continually combines and 
recombines #gures, texts, glitches and numbers by passing electronic 
signals between the nodal points of the internetwork; constructing 
cells, building new connections and creating proliferating, mimetic 
surfaces. The time of the digital image is not the linear, chronological 
time of the photographic archive, but something much more fractal, 
simultaneous and recursive.5 Multiplicity and instantaneity are 
now part of the digital image no less than the ability to order and 
demarcate historical time was part of the analogue photograph.6
Consider for instance that once uploaded to a computer and  
attached to the network, an image is not constrained to a single  
physical location but is able to move almost instantaneously from 
one place to another or appear simultaneously in several places at 
once. Within each contemporaneous context this blob of data forms a 
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temporary unity with other images, with varied and discontinuous ex-
periential outcomes. Some instances of the image form “information 
spaces” that contribute to setting up narrative continuity.7 In some of 
these narrations the image might enter a sequence with other images 
and form a series, yet in other instances the image might fail to  
link-up or proceed to connect with an entirely different series. It is  
not only the case that photography is more-than-visual since  
becoming digital and networked, but also that the visuality of digital  
photography is augmented by the resonance of this instantaneous 
transformation – by the ability to affect and be affected, by the 
unpredictable diversity and simultaneity of the network. A digital 
image might be directly linked to a time and place in the past, or it 
can be synthetic, constructed within the bowels of the network purely 
through computation; but in any case it is also the product of the 
duplications, variations, transformations, and calculations which are 
part of the algorithmic and coded structure of the network.8 As digital 
images form series, continuities and assemblages they enter into  
relationships with other images, processes, machines and symbols, 
and in each instance material connections are formed that create  
concrete social realities. That the digital image is not meaningless is 
evident, but it is also evident that it cannot be “read” or “unpacked” 
with the tools of visual analysis because semiology and representa-
tion are unable to follow the narrative diversity in which meaningful 
sequences are not pre-given but develop out of logical statements, 
relational conditions, coded transformations and permutations that 
characterise encoded landscapes.9
Thinking Inside the Box
The world-view that asserted the superiority of the representational 
model persisted more or less unperturbed until the beginning of the 
20th century, when this image of the universe was challenged, or rather 
demolished by the development of quantum theory. Suddenly the 
deterministic paradigm was (ipped on its head; gone was the rational 
clock model, and the universe turned out to be unpredictable and 
chaotic, and every clock was to some extent a nebulous, indeterminate 
and amorphous cloud. This discovery was made by physicists studying 
electrons, photons and other quantum entities, but their )ndings had 
consequences that reached far beyond the sub-atomic level. As Heinz 
Pagels said in his book The Cosmic Code:
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There is no meaning to the objective existence of an electron 
at some point in space, for example at one of the two holes, 
independent of actual observation. The electron seems to spring 
into existence as a real object only when we observe it[…] 
reality is in part created by the observer.10
For Vilém Flusser, the discovery of quantum physics meant that the 
old categories of matter and form were found wanting. Instead of 
the centralised logic of representation that emanates from the optical 
nerve towards the outer limits of space, he proposed to think of matter 
as made of layers, and not governed by a single set of laws: 
“matter” now looks very much like a series of Russian dolls, 
one containing the others. The biggest doll is astronomical 
(Einsteinian), it contains the molecular doll (Newtonian), which 
contains the atomic doll (where mass and energy merge), which 
again contains the nuclear doll (where causality abdicates in 
favour of statistics), which again contains the particle doll 
(which poses curious problems of symmetry) and the smallest 
doll is the quark doll (where it is dif%cult, even meaningless, to 
distinguish between phenomenon and mathematical symbol).11
For the physicist Erwin Schrödinger, the repercussions of quantum 
physics were so shocking that he devised the thought experiment that 
became known as “Schrödinger’s cat”. Nowhere is the strangeness 
and outwordliness of quantum physics better demonstrated than in 
the famous exercise that involves a certain cat, a deadly device that 
can be triggered by a single particle, and a particle generator. What is 
even more remarkable is that this experiment captures something of 
the innate ambiguity of the photographic image as it travels between 
the layers of matter. This is because Schrödinger’s cat suggests a  
new regime of the image, one in which the image is not a placeholder 
for a linear narrative but the visual manifestation of the difference 
between narratives.
The experiment places a cat inside a sealed room, isolated from 
all possibility of outside interference. Inside the room there is a light 
source that emits a single photon which passes through a half-silvered 
mirror. When the photon hits the mirror its re&ection is split into two. 
The photon has a 50% chance of going through the mirror and hitting 
the wall and a 50% chance of being re&ected down onto the light 
sensitive cell. Under normal circumstances, if the photo-cell registers a 
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beam of light it records it as an image, however in this experiment the 
wave-function of the photon triggers the photo-cell to smash a phial 
of cyanide which kills the cat.12 If on the other hand the photon passes 
through the mirror without being re%ected, then the photo-cell does 
not register an exposure and the cat is saved.
Now, for someone who is witnessing the event from inside the 
sealed room, (presumably wearing full protective gear against the 
deadly cyanide fumes), once the photon is &red the cat will be either 
dead or alive as we would expect. However – and this is the crux of 
the experiment – for an observer who is outside the room, the position 
of the photon is undetermined and consequentially the cat is both 
dead and alive at the same time. According to classical quantum 
physics (the so-called Copenhagen interpretation), when the particle 
is not being observed it does not behave like a particle at all but 
like a mixture of waves which represent the various probabilities of 
&nding the particle somewhere within the box.13 However, when an 
observer is making a measurement, the act of measuring itself forces 
the quantum entity to choose one or another of these states. The 
curious and disturbing conclusion is that for each of the observers the 
factual reality of the experiment is different: for the observer inside 
the box the cat is either dead or alive, which is consistent with our 
existential experience of the world, but for the observer outside the 
box the indeterminacy of the unobserved particle forces the cat to 
be both dead and alive at the same time. The consequences of this 
insight could not be greater, for they not only mean that the laws of 
Newtonian physics do not apply to quantum particles, but they also 
suggest that the rational logic of traditional physics and mathematics 
cannot account for the events taking place within the dark chamber  
of the cat experiment.
Recall that the whole Newtonian-Cartesian framework was 
premised on the idea that reality can be accurately represented either 
mathematically with the aid of formulas or visually with the aid of 
perspective. In either case, to be known scienti&cally or experienced 
aesthetically a thing must be other than the knower because a thing  
is only known as a representation.14 However, Schrödinger’s cat points 
to the collapse of representation as the idea that knowledge is external 
to the subject and can be objectively represented.
This is because the bifurcation of the real into two separate 
realities cannot be represented, or in the words of Deleuze ‘[t]he 
diversity of narrations cannot be explained by the avatars of the 
signi&er, by the states of linguistic structure which is assumed to 
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underline images in general’.15 Because for each of the observers 
reality is different, no uni%ed representation of it is possible. Instead, 
difference and not representation is the underpinning principle that 
holds the two observers together while simultaneously making them 
irreconcilable with each other.
Schrödinger devised the cat experiment to demonstrate the 
absurdity of applying quantum logic to something as big and complex 
as a cat, but the result was just the opposite. According to Newtonian 
laws of motion, not to mention standard logical reasoning, an object 
cannot be in two places at once. And yet, Schrödinger’s cat stubbornly 
insists on being both alive and dead at the same time, inhabiting what 
became known as a state of indeterminacy.16
Before letting go of the cat, let me spell out the signi%cance of the 
feline to photography. The photographic aspect of this experiment is 
not only in exposure of the light-sensitive cell to a particle of light but 
also – and critically – in the requirement for isolation between the 
room with the cat and the observer outside the room. This rupture 
exposes the divide between the moment of inscription by light that is 
taking place within the camera and the moment of “developing” that 
is taking place when a measurement is being made. In this rupture 
the ontological condition of the photographic image is revealed as 
the difference between two incommensurable states. The principle 
of photography is not in the indexical connection between past and 
present, nor is it the representation of abstract forms, but in the 
visual presentation of time as internally divided. The requirement 
for rupture institutes the possibility of an image that captures 
indeterminacy and a-symmetry as the very condition of visuality. The 
exposure produced by %ring a single particle captures the difference 
between the two observers. It is neither the dead cat not the alive 
one that constitutes the image, rather, the photographic element of 
the experiment is the very possibility of the co-existence of the two 
and the %guration of the difference between them. In other words, 
difference is expressed through the heterogeneity of narrations 
underpinned by the bifurcation of time. This bifurcation constitutes 
the materiality of the photographic image while at the same time 
asserting its indeterminacy.17 As the digital image on the computer 
screen is a con%guration of particles that were clumped together by 
a computational process, it is signi%cant that a quantum inspired 
understanding of photography suggests that apart from the forms 
of content such as perception, identity and representation, images 
are also forms of expression that contain open ended re(ections 
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on the nature of computation, indeterminacy and the limits of 
representation.18
Getting slightly ahead of myself I want to signal that these 
understandings pre%gure some of the conditions that describe the 
fate of the photographic image in digital culture. The condition of 
reproducibility does not warrant a connection with %xed reality. 
Instead, each repetition of the image opens up the possibility of 
indeterminacy, variation and multiplication that can pull the image 
away from an indexical connection with the past. Within the network 
the image operates on several levels – computational, electro-magnetic, 
economic, conceptual, particle – and each level produces separate  
but interconnected affects. The inherent instability of this assemblage 
makes it impossible to %x the meaning of the image and limit it to 
the content available to the gaze. Instead, signi%cance and agency 
are formed by the relations, interactions and dialogues between the 
different parts of the system. In other words, meaning is established 
not through the procedure of representation but according to the 
manifold of relations to the other parts of the network.19
Plastic Control
Radical and liberating as quantum indeterminism was, with all the 
ensuing multiplicities of time and the polyphony of voices on offer, 
and notwithstanding the energising effect indeterminism had on art 
and literature, there was still a problem with this world view, which, 
to put it quite simply, threatened to undermine the whole project of 
converting all the clocks into clouds. This problem can be summed 
up as follows: the indeterminism model was at its core a theory that 
asserted that everything is governed by chance and nothing else.  
It suggested that the strict rules of the Newtonian clock universe be 
replaced by randomness, chaos and irresponsibility. In an article  
titled ‘On Clouds and Clocks’ Karl Popper sums this up nicely:
If determinism is true, then the whole world is a perfectly 
running &awless clock, including all clouds, all organisms,  
all animals, and all men. If, on the other hand, Peirce’s  
or Heisenberg’s or some other form of indeterminism is true,  
then sheer chance plays a major role in our physical world.  
But is chance really more satisfactory than determinism?20
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If everything in life is decided with the throw of a metaphysical dice, 
what hope is there to build a free and just society? Quite clearly, none 
whatsoever. If the determinism of the swinging pendulum seemed 
oppressive and inescapable, then how much more inescapable and 
how in,nitely more oppressive is the thought that we are thrown into 
an abyss with no logic, no rules and no hope of getting out. This is 
the kind of desperate abyss that lead the exasperated Dostoyevsky to 
proclaim in Brothers Karamazov: ‘If there is no god then everything 
is permitted!’ It appeared that the discoveries of quantum physics, 
combined with Einstein’s theory of relativity threatened to do more 
than to simply overturn the old rational paradigm: in addition  
to heralding the age of nuclear power and supper-computing it 
also seemed likely to unleash a form of radical nihilism that would 
jeopardise the very idea of freedom, choice and responsibility  
and replace them with an entropic mayhem were everything is down 
to accident.21 
For Popper the dangers of this kind of nihilism were too grave to 
ignore. For one thing, this free-for-all indeterminism was only a step 
away from a fascist state, where no ethical or moral rules apply and 
everything is determined by pure force. If nihilism is the only certainty, 
how do you maintain some form of control over the rampant and 
unrestrained urges that are sure to raise their ugly heads? And to 
complicate matters further, how do you keep behaviour in check 
without appealing to the higher power of god, the absolute, or the 
torture chambers of the secret police?
Popper’s solution to this double headed problem of chaos versus 
determinism was simple and brilliant, and he named it “plastic 
control”. It was simple because he placed a middle point, a kind of 
halfway-house between the predictability of the determinist clock 
and indeterminism of the cloud. In positing plastic control as an 
intermediate membrane or a semi-conductor between determinism 
and chaos, between the world of representations and the world of 
probabilities, Popper sidestepped the dualism that maintained that 
things can only be one way or the other: either a cloud or a clock, 
either mind of body, image or object. Even more astonishingly, Popper 
suggested that this layer of plastic tissue is not another system, not a 
cloudy clock or a clockwork cloud, rather it is the site of consciousness, 
feelings, desires and sensations. In Popper’s own words:
we want to understand how such non-physical things as 
purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, intentions, 
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and values, can play a part in bringing about physical changes 
in the physical world.22 
Plastic control is therefore a cluster of appetites, affects and passions 
that brings together the physical and the analytical, combining 
them into something both carnal and controlling, both sensual and 
cerebral. In other words, Popper uncovered a synthetic diagram of 
social, political, erotic and physical drives that forms images out 
of chaos. Plastic control does not discipline chaos, but allows it to 
create connections between bits of matter and bits of ideas that do 
not $t with each-other like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle and yet they form 
something like a constellation or an archipelago, or a network.23 
According to the logic of plastic control, meaning is not to be 
located in the deterministic world of the clocks but equally neither is 
it in the indeterminate world of the clouds. As the grey area where 
feelings, desires, and games of chance rule over logic and reason, 
plastic control offers a glimpse into non-binary thinking that rejects 
the dualisms of form and content.24 In the world of the computer 
networks, plastic controls are the algorithms that translate the 
social world of human activity into something that computers can 
understand as data. And conversely, plastic controls take computer 
data and make it into something that looks like a photograph when it 
appears on a screen.
Plastic control allows one to step away from the dialectical 
reasoning that conceives photography in terms of presence and 
absence, practice and theory, subject and object. It also exposes the 
fallacy of thinking about digital photography as being somehow 
immaterial or virtual. Digital images can be made without a camera, 
without chemistry, without lenses, even without light, which means 
that all the old rhetoric about photography being the trace of the 
real, or having an indexical connection to events in the past does not 
have to apply to the digital-born image. The idea that photographs 
have a representational, indexical or signifying connection with 
events, people and objects in the real world does not need to hold for 
digital images that rely on electronic signal and computation. The 
destabilisation of photographic meaning is the direct result of the 
image being detached from universal notions of representation and 
re-staged in terms of the plastic materiality that $gures the image 
through difference, bifurcation and self-replication.
This understanding of the digital image as unchained from the 
dualisms of Western metaphysical thought can help to advance a 
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way of thinking that is taking on board the material conditions of 
the network. However, this insight requires the overcoming of the 
tendency of idealist aesthetics to think of photography as a process 
that mediates the world with the agency of light to produce legible 
signs. As the Schrödinger’s Cat experiment suggests, the processes that 
govern particle distribution call for a different distinction between 
materiality and form. As there is no uni#ed visual #eld the narrative 
is in every case irreducibly different. A further consequence to the 
overcoming of aesthetic representational thought is that the digital 
image does not have to be understood in visual terms as something 
to be looked at. Rather the digital image both undermines and 
transcends representation by actualising an interval between itself and 
its object. Through its diversity of narrations the digital image acts as 
a reminder that only the identical, the normative and the similar can 
be captured by representation while the expressive, the singular and 
the non-identical remains outside its reach. 
It is however salutary to remember that representation operates 
in two distinct but interconnected ways: as a kind of epistemological 
code that organises information by creating order out of chaos, and as 
a political system that organises communities by instituting a shared 
ethical code. The principle common to all regimes of representation 
is the exclusion of everything that is singular and non-identical: the 
barbarian, the freak, the abnormal and the different need not apply. 
One does not have to be a unicorn or a little green man to be subjected 
to the exclusion principle: it is sometimes enough to speak with a 
slight accent, to stutter, to have a lame foot or anarchist tendencies. 
For this reason, the question for post-liberal political thought is 
how to inaugurate a community that does not depend on the codes 
of representation; how to remain sceptical and suspicious about the 
tendency of images and languages to privilege identity and cohesion 
over the clamour of disparate voices. Deleuze and Guattari name 
this non-representational community the nomadic war machine. Its 
primary objective is not war against the state but resistance to the 
forms of iconology of the state: 
The war machine is that nomad invention that in fact has war 
not as its primary object but as its second-order, supplementary 
or synthetic objective, in the sense that it is determined in such 
a way as to destroy the State-form and city-form with which  
it collides.25
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This dimension of the war machine cements its relevance to the 
concept of the digital image: the modern capitalist state is marked 
by the systematic codi#cation of life along the axes of technicity and 
representation26 so as to eliminate libidinal creativity that constitutes 
the only possibility of resistance to empirical reality.27
The digital image allows for the non-visual within the visual 
to become manifest as a diagram of the diversity of fragments. The 
digital image belongs simultaneously to two regimes of the visual: it 
is the annunciation of difference as the condition of visuality and it is 
a computational fractal that has no depth, no inside and no outside. 
Thanks to this “double articulation” the digital image is both a #gure 
of identity and a #gure of transformation of identity into new and 
unpredictable states. Variation and unpredictability are of another 
order than representation. They cannot themselves become a subject 
of representation or be reduced to it. What the digital image is capable 
of is to express the irreducible schism between the computational 
and the representational, not dialectically as “lack” or “absence” 
or “the excluded middle”, but as something inhabited and yet non-
representational, like the grin of Schrödinger’s cat.
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Notes
1. Central to the representational model is the glass-cut distinction 
between that which the eye can see and that which the mind can  
comprehend. Descartes famously demonstrated how unreliable vision is 
by comparing seeing to the actions of a blind man who tries to identify 
objects by tapping on them with a stick. René Descartes, Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Elizabeth Anscombe and Peter T. Geach (Great Britain: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1970), 248-9. He argued that the 
mind, on the other hand, is capable of seeing the truth thanks to the 
power of reason, which converts the distorted picture painted by the 
senses into true knowledge. In this way the mind became the true organ 
of seeing, and the eye (and with it the rest of the body) assumed the role 
of unreliable witness. This imagistic and pictorial model of the world 
achieved its most complete development in Kant’s Critique of Pure  
Reason: ‘Our representation of things as they are given to us does not 
conform to them as things in themselves, but, on the contrary, that these 
objects as appearances conform to our mode of representation.’  
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. F Max Müller and  
Marcus Weigelt (London & New York: Penguin, 2007), 20 Bxx, xxi. 
Simply stated, this means that I experience the world as a uni(ed  
time-space continuum not because that is what the world really is but 
because I experience myself as a uni(ed entity. See also: David Summers,  
‘Representation’, in Critical Terms for Art History, ed. Robert Nelson 
and Richard Shiff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3-17.
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2. Joseph Nechvatal, Towards An Immersive Intelligence: Essays on 
the Work of Art in the Age of Computer Technology and Virtual Reality 
1993-2006 (New York: Edgewise Press, 2009), 9.
3. For a discussion of a photographic system that does not involve 
visual presentation but is managed entirely by computers see: John Tagg, 
‘Mindless Photography’, in Photography; Theoretical Snapshots, ed. 
Edward Welch et al. (London: Routledge, 2009), 20-21.
4. Nigel Thrift, Non-representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect 
(Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 1-27.
5. Johnny Golding, ‘The Assassination of Time: (or the Birth of Zeta-
physics)’, in Writing History/Deleuzian Events, ed. Hanjo Berressem and 
Leyla Haferkamp (Koln: daad, 2009), 132-145.
6. On demarcation of time see: Peter Wollen, cited in David Green and 
Joanna Lowry, Stillness and Time; Photography and the Moving Image 
(Brighton: Photoworks / Photoforum, 2006), 17.
7. “Information space”, as a space structured through the -ow of 
information, is drawing on the concept of “timed space”, as developed 
by Parkes and Thrift. See: Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift, ‘Putting Time in 
Its Place’, in Making Sense of Time, ed. Tommy Carlstein (New York: J. 
Wiley, 1978), 119-129.
8. On the agency of code and its inherent undecidability (and how 
this undecidability is politically manipulated) see: Lucas Introna, ‘The 
Enframing of Code’, Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011), 
113-141. On algorithmic photography see: Daniel Rubinstein and 
Katrina Sluis, ‘The Digital Image in Photographic Culture; Algorithmic 
Photography and the Crisis of Representation’, in Martin Lister (ed), The 
Photographic Image in Digital Culture, 2nd Edition (London: Routledge, 
2013).
9. Introna, ‘The Enframing of Code’. Also see: Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 
2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (London: 
Athlone Press, 1989), 22-40. 
10. Heinz Pagels, quoted in John R .Gribbin, In Search of the 
Multiverse: Parallel Worlds, Hidden Dimensions, and the Ultimate 
Quest for the Frontiers of Reality (Hoboken, nj: John Wiley & Sons, 
2010), 20.
11. Vilém Flusser, ‘Immaterialism’, Philosophy of Photography 2, no. 2 
(2012): 219-225.
12. Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, 
Minds, and the Laws of Physics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
375-6. See also: John Gribbin, In Search of the Multiverse, 170-2.
13. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, 375-6.
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14. Claire Colebrook, Ethics and Representation: From Kant to  
Post-structuralism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 2.
15. Deleuze, Cinema 2, 137.
16. Adrian Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary (Edinburgh University Press, 
2005), 60.
17. Dorothea Olkowski, ‘Time Lost, Instaneity and the Image’, 
Parallax 9, no. 1 (2003), 28-38.
18. Flusser, ‘Immaterialism’, 218-9. This is not to suggest that 
photography became undecidable only since becoming digital. On 
the contrary, one of the most overlooked and under-theorised aspects 
of analogue photography is the so called “latent image”: the invisible 
formation of silver halides produced by the exposure of light-sensitive 
emulsion to light. The latent image is not only indeterminate but also 
enigmatic, for until it is chemically developed there is no way of +nding 
out what the image contains, yet development also destroys the latent 
image, effectively severing the connection between the image and the 
object.
19. Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: 
Deviations From Deleuze and Guattari (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 
1992), 19.
20. Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 226.
21. ‘The underlying idea is that our body is a kind of machine which 
can be regulated by a lever or switch from one or more central control 
points. Descartes even went so far as to locate the control point precisely: 
it is in the pineal gland, he said, that mind acts upon the body. Some 
quantum theorists suggested (and Compton very tentatively accepted 
the suggestion) that our minds work upon our bodies by in0uencing or 
selecting some quantum jumps.’ Ibid., 232-233.
22. Ibid., 229.
23. ‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the 
reservoir or reserve of purely conceptual events […] The plane is like a 
desert that concepts populate without dividing up. The only regions of 
the plane are concepts themselves, but the plane is all that holds them 
together.’ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? Trans. 
Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London, New York: Verso, 
1994), 35-36.
24. This understanding of “plastic control” is inspired by Johnny 
Golding, ‘Ana-materialism and the Pineal Eye: Becoming Mouth-breast 
(or Visual Arts After Descartes, Bataille, Butler, Deleuze and Synthia 
with An ‘s’’. Philosophy of Photography 3, no. 1 (2012), 99-121.
25. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. 
Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2003), 418.
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